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NOTE AND COMMENT
DEEDS DELIVERED CONDITIONALLY TO THE GRANT-.--Generally courts have
shown a commendable disposition to get away from the formalism, which in
the past played such a large part in determination of questions of delivery.
While the actual tradition of the instrument to the grantee or to someone
on his behalf, on the one hand, or its retention in the hands of the maker,
on the other, is still very important evidentially, such facts are not by any
means controlling. Thus it is entirely possible for a deed to be delivered
though it never has been out of the grantor's hands; likewise a deed may
be undelivered though in the hands of the grantee by the voluntary act of
the grantor. See the discussion by Professor Tiffany ir I7 MCHc. L. Rv. 1o4,
et seq., citing many cases. This result has come from the growing appre-
ciation by the courts that delivery after all is simply the manifestation of the
grantor's intent that, as to him, the instrument is a completed legal act.
This intent is normally shown by a handing over of the deed to the grantee
or to someone- for him, but there are other ways of showing such intent.
A deed in the hands of the grantor prima fade has been delivered; if in the
hands of the grantor, prima facie, it has not been delivered.
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It is, however, remarkable that in certain types 
of cases there is adher-
ence to the old, formalistic idea that the conclusions 
referred to above as
prima facie are conclusive. This is especially striking 
in those cases where
a deed is handed to the grantee to become 
final and operative only on the
happening of an event or the performance 
of some condition. In Whyd-
don's Case, Cro. Eliz. 520, decided in i596 by 
the Court of Common Pleas,
and in Williams v. Green, Cro. Eliz. 884, by 
the same court in x602, it was
held that "the delivery of a deed cannot be averred 
to be to the party himself
as an escrow." The contrary was held by 
the Queen's Bench in i6oi in
Hawksland v. Gatchel, Cro. Eliz. 835. While it 
cannot be said that the
English courts have repudiated Whyddon's Case, 
there are reasons for think-
ing that when the question comes up squarely 
for decision the doctrine of
Hawksland v. Gatchel will be followed. See Murray 
v. Earl of Stair, 2 B. &
C. 82; Watkins v. Nash, L. R. 2o Eq. 262; London 
Freehold & Leasehold
Property Co. v. Suffield, (1897) 2 Ch. 6o8.
In this country the courts very generally have 
approved of Whyddon'
Case, even the mLst recent decisions. Weber v. Christen, 
121 Ill. 9; Wilson
V. Jenks. 63 Ind. App. 6x5; Hriple
fr v. Wipfler. 153 Mich. x8; Hamlin v. Ham-
lin, 192 N. Y. i64;.Chaudoir v. Witt, (Wis. igxg) 
174 N. W. 925. The reas-
oning underlying these holdings, when any is disclosed 
by the opinion, is
shown by the following from the opinion of Gray, J. in Hamlin 
v. Hamlin,
supra: "If we should give full effect to the plaintiff's 
claim, it would be to
hold the delivery by her of the deeds to have been conditioned 
and not abso-
lute; but that would be violative of the settled rule 
in this state that a de-
livery cannot be made to the grantee conditionally. 
Any oral condition ac-
companying the delivery, in such case, would be repugnant 
to the terms of
the deed and parol evidence to prove that there was 
such a condition attached
to the delivery is inadmissible. The reason for the rule 
applies to every case
where the delivery is intended to give effect to a deed 
without the further
act of the grantor and such was this case * * * These 
deeds had passed out
of the plaintiff's possession and into that of the grantee, 
by the deliberate
act of the former, and no oral condition, at the time, 
will be admitted to
contradict the import of the written instruments." In short, the trouble 
is,
as these courts view it, that the admission of parol evidence 
to show the
condition is to violate the parol evidence rule.
In his celebrated work on Evidence Dean Wigmore has pointed 
out with
characteristic clearness the true nature of the so-called 
Parol Evidence Rule.
4 WIGwoRZ o2 EvIDENcS, § 24oo, et seq. The 
matter here under consider-
ation involves that part of the Rule 'dealing with the "enaction, or creation,
of the act." Parol evidence is almost invariably admissible 
to show that no
legal act has been consummated. Ibid. § 24o8. In Curry 
v. Colburn, 99 Wis.
319, it was held that a grantor could show that his 
deed, which was complete
on its face, had been handed to the &rantee only for the 
purpose of taking
it to an attorney for examination. See, too, Sample v. Greathard, 
281 Ill. 79.
Yet both these courts hold that a grantor will not be permitted 
to show by
parol that a deed handed to the grantee was to become operative 
only on the
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happening of an event. In Wilson v. Powers, T31 Mass. 539, in an action on apromissory note it was held permissible to show that the note had been
handed to the payee to take effect only on the performance of a condition.
Devens, J., said: "The manual delivery of an instrument may always beproved to have been on a condition which has not been fulfilled in order to
avoid its effect." In truth it seems that with reference to instruments other
than deeds of conveyance such facts may be proved. See Pyrn v. Campbell,
6 E. & B. 370; 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCS, § 241o. There seems to be here a
striking instance of a survival of a formalistic* doctrine (explained by the
relation between delivery of deeds of conveyance and primitive modes of
conveyance) regarding which English courts have shown a more enlightened
view than have courts on this side. Indeed this is characteristic of the
attitudes of the courts in the two countries regarding the law of Real Prop-
erty, generally.
Reference should be made to Lee v. Richmond, 9o Iowa 696, where the
rule of Whyddon's Case was not applied. R. W. A.
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